Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner
Conspiracy to defraud does not require deceit, and covers an agreement by dishonesty to deprive a person of something which is his or to which he might be entitled, or to injure his proprietary rights.
Facts
Scott agreed with cinema employees that they would temporarily remove films from the cinemas without the owners' consent, so that he could make pirate copies to sell, and then return the films. The copyright owners and distributors lost the fees they would otherwise have received. Scott was convicted of conspiracy to defraud, and argued that the offence required an agreement to deceive the victim, which was absent.
Legal principle
The House of Lords dismissed his appeal. Viscount Dilhorne said that it is clearly the law that an agreement by two or more persons by dishonesty to deprive a person of something which is his or to which he is or would be or might be entitled, or an agreement by two or more by dishonesty to injure some proprietary right of his, suffices to constitute the offence of conspiracy to defraud, and that deceit is not a necessary element. The common law offence of conspiracy to defraud was preserved by the Criminal Law Act 1977 and remains in use, particularly in complex fraud cases.
Related cases on inchoate offences and accessorial liability
- Anderton v Ryan [1985] AC 560
- Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773
- Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1992) [1993] 1 WLR 274
- DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350
- Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476
- National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11
- R v Anderson [1986] AC 27
- R v Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129
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