Haughton v Smith
At common law, a person could not be guilty of attempting to handle stolen goods that were no longer stolen, a rule reversed by the Criminal Attempts Act 1981.
Facts
Police stopped a van loaded with corned beef that had been stolen. They took control of the van and allowed it to continue its journey, with police officers on board, so that they could catch the people who were going to receive the goods. Mr Smith helped to unload the van, believing that the goods were stolen. Because the goods had been recovered by the police, they were no longer stolen goods in law. He was convicted of attempting to handle stolen goods.
Legal principle
The House of Lords quashed the conviction. It held that, at common law, a person could not be guilty of attempting to commit an offence that was impossible to commit, because the goods were no longer stolen. Mr Smith could not be guilty of attempting to do something that, if he had done it, would not have been a crime. This decision was reversed by section 1(2) and (3) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, which provide that a person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence even though the facts are such that its commission is impossible. That provision was applied by the House of Lords in R v Shivpuri.
Related cases on inchoate offences and accessorial liability
- Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773
- Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1992) [1993] 1 WLR 274
- DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350
- National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11
- R v Anderson [1986] AC 27
- R v Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129
- R v Becerra and Cooper (1975) 62 Cr App R 212
- R v Campbell (1991) 93 Cr App R 350
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