National Coal Board v Gamble
A person who knowingly supplies the means to commit an offence may be guilty of aiding and abetting it, even if he is indifferent as to whether it is committed.
Facts
A lorry driver had his lorry filled with coal at a colliery owned by the National Coal Board. It was weighed on a weighbridge operated by an employee of the Board, who told the driver that the load was well over the weight limit for the lorry. The driver said that he would take the risk, and the weighbridge operator gave him a ticket that allowed him to leave the colliery. The driver was convicted of driving an overloaded lorry on the road, and the Board was charged with aiding and abetting the offence.
Legal principle
The Divisional Court held that the Board was guilty. Devlin J said that a person who supplies another with the means to commit an offence, knowing that it is to be used for that purpose, is guilty of aiding and abetting, even if he is indifferent as to whether the offence is committed. The intention required is an intention to aid, not a purpose or desire that the offence be committed. The weighbridge operator, who knew the load was too heavy, had the necessary knowledge when he handed over the ticket, and his act was the act of the Board.
Related cases on inchoate offences and accessorial liability
- Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] QB 773
- Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1992) [1993] 1 WLR 274
- DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350
- Haughton v Smith [1975] AC 476
- R v Anderson [1986] AC 27
- R v Bainbridge [1960] 1 QB 129
- R v Becerra and Cooper (1975) 62 Cr App R 212
- R v Campbell (1991) 93 Cr App R 350
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