R v Z
Evidence of earlier offences of which the defendant had been acquitted could be admitted as similar fact evidence, because the principle of double jeopardy did not prevent the use of such evidence in a later trial.
Facts
Z was charged with rape, and his defence was that the complainant consented, or that he believed she did. He had previously been tried four times for rape, and acquitted three times. The prosecution wished to call the complainants in the earlier cases to give evidence of how he had behaved towards them, as similar fact evidence to rebut his defence. The judge ruled that the evidence of the complainants in the cases where he had been acquitted was inadmissible, because it would undermine the acquittals.
Legal principle
The House of Lords held that the evidence was admissible. Lord Hutton said that the principle of double jeopardy operates to prevent a person from being prosecuted again for the same offence, but does not render inadmissible evidence which is relevant to a later charge merely because it shows that the defendant was guilty of an offence of which he had been acquitted. The defendant was not being tried again for the earlier offences, and the evidence was relevant and probative of his guilt of the present offence. The approach is preserved under the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
Related cases on character evidence
- Director of Public Prosecutions v P [1991] 2 AC 447
- Makin v Attorney General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57
- R v Brewster [2010] EWCA Crim 1194
- R v Hanson [2005] EWCA Crim 824
- R v Highton [2005] EWCA Crim 1985
- R v Hunter [2015] EWCA Crim 631
- R v Vye [1993] 1 WLR 471
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