Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd
The courts will try to give effect to commercial agreements and will not treat terms as too vague if their meaning can be found from the background and the parties' previous dealings.
Facts
Hillas agreed in 1930 to buy 22,000 standards of softwood goods of fair specification from Arcos for delivery during the 1930 season. The contract also gave Hillas an option to buy 100,000 standards in 1931, without specifying the kinds or sizes of timber. When Hillas tried to exercise the option for 1931, Arcos refused, arguing that the option was too vague to be enforced.
Legal principle
The House of Lords held that the option was binding. Lord Wright said that business men often record the most important agreements in crude and summary fashion, and that it is the duty of the court to construe such documents fairly and broadly, without being too astute or subtle in finding defects. The court should not be the destroyer of bargains. The terms could be given a reasonable meaning by reference to the 1930 contract and the practice of the timber trade, and the parties had intended to be bound. The case is contrasted with May and Butcher v R.
Related cases on offer and acceptance
- Adams v Lindsell (1818) 1 B & Ald 681
- Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club Ltd v Blackpool Borough Council [1990] 1 WLR 1195
- Brinkibon Ltd v Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesellschaft mbH [1983] 2 AC 34
- Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v Ex-Cell-O Corp (England) Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 401
- Byrne & Co v Van Tienhoven & Co (1880) 5 CPD 344
- Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256
- Dickinson v Dodds (1876) 2 Ch D 463
- Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corp [1955] 2 QB 327
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