Conway v Rimmer
One of the first uses of the Practice Statement: the courts, not ministers, have the final say on whether documents are withheld in the public interest.
Facts
Mr Conway, a probationary police constable, was prosecuted for theft of a torch and acquitted. He was then dismissed and sued his former superintendent for malicious prosecution. He wanted to see reports written about him during his probation. The Home Secretary certified that the reports belonged to a class of documents whose disclosure would be injurious to the public interest. Under Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1942] AC 624, a decision of the House of Lords, such a certificate was conclusive.
Legal principle
The House of Lords held that a minister's certificate was not conclusive, and that the court could inspect the documents and decide for itself whether the public interest in withholding them outweighed the public interest in the proper administration of justice. The House departed from Duncan v Cammell Laird, so far as it held that the certificate was conclusive, in one of the earliest uses of the 1966 Practice Statement. After inspecting the reports, the House ordered their disclosure.
Related cases on judicial precedent
- Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23, [2005] 2 AC 580
- Austin v Southwark London Borough Council [2010] UKSC 28, [2011] 1 AC 355
- British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877
- Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd [1972] AC 1027
- Davis v Johnson [1979] AC 264
- Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349
- Knauer v Ministry of Justice [2016] UKSC 9, [2016] AC 908
- Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd [1976] AC 443
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